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and that it should be compensated by receiving an amount equal to the total
salaries of the executives plus 15% of the net profit of the contracting
company which it would use to purchase shares from the shareholder. The
three executives became officers of the management company and resigned
as employees of the contracting company although they retained their respec-
tive titles so there was no ostensible change in the operations. It will be
observed that although this arrangement resulted in a saving of income tax
compared with the amount that would have been payable had the 15% of
profits been divided among the three executives as individuals, the evidence,
accepted by the trial judge, was that the primary purpose was not tax avoid-
ance but the design of an efficient method by which these executives, and
possibly others later on, could acquire a share interest in the contracting
company. Notwithstanding this finding, the Minister characterized the whole
transaction as a sham and assessed the individuals in disregard of the manage-
ment company. Having failed in the Exchequer Court, the Minister carried
his submissions to the Supreme Court of Canada where he also lost. Perhaps
if the scheme had been held to be for the purpose of tax avoidance he might
have succeeded.
Terence Sheard, Q.C.*
* Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Lte
TRADE MARKS - ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
- "DESCRIPTIVE"
The gulf between administrative and quasi-judicial practice on the one
hand, and judicial determination respecting that practice on the other hand
has existed as an enigma to practitioners and will undoubtedly continue tW
exist in future creating in effect a "two-tier" practice.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada illustrates a good
case in point. In Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Lte,1 an appeal from a
decision of Mr. Justice Noel of the Exchequer Court of Canada,2 Mr. Justice
Pigeon expressed the unanimous view of the Court in allowing the appeal.
1 (1971), 16 D. L.R. (3d) 740.
2 [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 313.
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Case Comment
An issue for determination was whether or not the words Orange Maison,
registered in the Canadian Trade Marks Office for use in Canada in associ-
ation with the sale of orange juice, were or were not validly under the
provisions of the Trade Marks Act,3 particularly section 12(1)(b) of that Act
which permits of registration of a word if it is not:
(b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive in the English or French languages of the character or quality
of the wares or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be
used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of
their place of origin;
This definition admits of a subjective test. The "strength" or "registrability"
of a trade mark is clearly inverse ratio to its descriptiveness. It is well settled
law that only descriptive words and not merely suggestive words are to be
denied registration. There exist many trade marks which bear an allusion or
reference to desirable characteristics of the product to which they are applied.
Examples are Talon for slide fasteners, Halo for shampoo and Xerex for anti-
freeze. The problem is, of course, to predict whether any given or proposed
trade mark is or will be considered to be merely suggestive or clearly
descriptive.
The Registrar of Trade Marks, who is the person responsible for admin-
istration of the Trade Marks Act and the person in the first instance required
to consider the registrability of trade marks under the Act, appears to set a
low standard in assessing this question. The Registrar seemingly allows to
be registered many marks which, could clearly under a more severe view of
section 12(1)(b) be considered to be descriptive of the character or quality
of the wares or services. The Registrar has allowed for registration for example,
the following:
Litter Green for animal litter,
Acne-Biotic for acne treatment preparations,
The Country Cheese, for cheese,
Grape Plus for a fruit drink,
Slimmers Glove for a massage glove,
Datekeeper for calendars, diaries and appointment records,
Stik Strip for adhesive,
A La Cat for cat food,
Trash Masher for a garbage compactor, and
Ground Pounder for earth compactors.
What test then is applied by the Courts as to "descriptiveness"? It would
appear from the Home Juice case, that a much different and a much more
severe test is imposed.
The words Orange Maison were registered by the Registrar of Trade
,Marks, for use in Canada in association with the sale of orange juice. That
registration was attacked by the appellant in the Supreme Court as being
"descriptive" contrary to section 12(1)(b). Mr. Justice Pigeon found that
3 1952-53 S.C., c. 49, now 1970 R.S.C. c. T-10.
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Orange Maison was descriptive of orange juice and expunged the registration,
except in the province of Quebec where it had acquired a "secondary
meaning".
It was argued by the trade mark owner that Orange Maison was distinc-
tive, that orange did not mean orange juice, and maison was, in this context,
merely fanciful.
As to the meaning of "orange", Mr. Justice Pigeon found that the words
"jus de" could be read in by implication, hence making Orange read in effect,
orange juice. He said:
Here, the trade mark is composed of two French words and this is not at all a case
of a covert allusion but that of an explicit description indeed. The omission of the
words "jus de" (juice) in no way prevents the word "Orange" from being descriptive
of the character of the wares, because those words are clearly understood through
the association with a liquid product. It must also be noted that respondent took
care, in his application for registration, to disclaim any right to the exclusive use
of the word "orange" by itself. It must therefore be said that the distinctive character
of the trade mark is claimed exclusively for the combination "Orange Maison".
But, as we have seen, the word "maison" thus placed clearly becomes an adjective
descriptive of quality.
With respect to "maison" the appellants asserted that it meant, in France,
"home-made" or "of good quality". The Court summarized:
In this Court, as in the Exchequer Court, the appellants in support of their conten-
tion as to the meaning of "Orange Maison" relied especially on two dictionaries
published in France in 1959: the Petit Larousse and the Robert. In both the definition
of the word "maison" used as an adjective is given as (translation): "that which has
been made at home" and also (translation): "of good quality."
The Court rejected an argument that these meanings of "maison" were
found only in France and not Quebec. He held that section 12(1)(b) precluded
use of words of the French language having meaning only in France, even
if no such meaning existed in Quebec.
Respondent has contended that the current meaning in France is not to be con-
sidered, that regard must be had only to the meaning current in Canada and that,
in the absence of any evidence, whether by dictionaries or otherwise, that the
meaning in question was current in Canada at the date of registration, no account
should be taken of a recent meaning found in France only. This contention would
have serious consequences if it was accepted. One result would be that a shrewd
trader could monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a trade mark
as soon as it started being used in France or in another French-speaking country
and before it could be shown to have begun being used in Canada.
In my opinion, the wording of s.12 does not authorize such a distinction. It refers
to a description "in the English or French languages". Each of these two languages
is international. When they are spoken of in common parlance they are considered
in their entirety and not as including only the vocabulary that is extremely difficult
to define especially in these days when communication media are not longer confined
within national boundaries.
He found therefore that Orange Maison meant, even if only in rare
instances in the French language as used in France, "home-made orange juice"
or "orange juice of good quality", hence was unregistrable as descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive of the character or quality of the product.
Therefore, when the meaning of the trade mark is analyzed in respect of the goods
to which it is affixed, the only possible conclusion is that the first word is an elliptical
description of their character and the second an explicit description of their quality.
[VOL. 11, No. 2
Case Comment
It appears from this decision that the Supreme Court is prepared to go
to some lengths to hold that a trade mark is merely descriptive.
This should not be surprising for it can be seen that Canadian juris-
prudence on the subject has to set a consistently high standard as to whether
or not a trade mark was descriptive or distinctive. In Fine Foods of Canada
Limited v. Metcalfe Foods Limited4 Maclean J. was commenting on trade
marks used in association with the sale of canned vegetables. He said at
page 25:
I may be permitted to say respectfully that I doubt if such marks as "Garden Patch"
or "Summer Pride", or "Garden Price" should be registered at all, on the ground
that they seem to suggest the place or time of production.
The Exchequer Court over the years has found "Finishing Engineer"
to be descriptive of periodical publications,5 "Thor-o-Mix" descriptive of
ready made concrete, 6 "Sea-lect" descriptive of quality of canned fish and
lobster,7 "Superset" descriptive of drilling tools s "True Confessions" descrip-
tive of magazines, 9 and "Once a Week" descriptive of floor polishes.10
The Supreme Court of Canada moreover held "frigidaire" to be descrip-
tive of refrigerators (with two dissents). 1
And finally in Silhouette Products Ltd. v. Prodon Industries Ltd.12 we
find Noel J. holding that a silhouette of a woman's head is prima facie non-
distinctive of hair care products, at page 138.
Moreover, I am of the opinion that a reproduction of a human head, closely related
such as here to wares used for the care of the hair, is prima facie non-distinctive.
The judgment of Mr. Justice Pigeon therefore, appears only to be
carrying on a well established tradition apparently not coinciding with the
practice at the administrative or quasi-judicial level in the Trade Marks Office.
It is interesting to note that all the trade marks I have cited as having been
allowed for registration by the Registrar, were allowed well after the Orange
Maison decision of the Supreme Court had been reported and presumably
considered by the Trade Marks Office.
What course should be adopted in face of this dichotomy? Should one
continue to advise clients based on the practice of the Trade Marks Office
4 [1942] Ex. C.R. 22.
5 The Association of Professional Engineers of the Province of Ontario v. The
Registrar of Trade Marks (1960), 19 Fox Pat. C. 69 (Ex. Ct.).
6 Thorold Concrete Products Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks (1962), 21 Fox
Pat. C. 206 (Ex. Ct.).
7 C. Fairall Fisher v. B. C. Packers Limited (1945), 5 Fox Pat. C. 50 (Ex. Ct.).
8 J. K. Smit & Sons of Canada Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks (1946), 5 Fox
Pat. C. 167 (Ex. Ct.).
9 Fawcett Publications Inc. v. Alexander Valentine (1950), 10 Fox Pat. C. 203.
10 The Drackett Co. of Canada Ltd. v. American Home Products (1968), 38 Fox
P.C. 1 (Ex. Ct.).
11 General Motors Corporation v. Bellows (1948), 7 Fox Pat. C. 130 (Ex. Ct.); 9 Fox
Pat. 0.78 (S.C.C.).
12 (1965), 35 Fox Pat. C. 129 (Ex. Ct.).
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and continue to seek registration of arguably or even obviously descriptive
words; or should one take a more cautious approach and advise the adoption
and registration only of trade marks which appear to meet the stricter tests
imposed by the courts?
The problem is by no means a new one. Francis Bacon in his Essay
"Of Judicature" in 1625 reminded "Therefore it is a happy thing in a state
when kings (Registrars ?) and states do often consult with judges . . . when
there is matter of law intervenant in business of state. For many times the
things deducted to judgment may be meum and tuum when the reason and
consequence thereof may trench to point of estate". To this many practitioners
in the trade marks field would say Amen.
Donald F. Sim, Q.C.*
Member of the Ontario Bar, Special Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University.
